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THE PRESS AND GUANTANAMO BAY
MICHELLE LINDO MCCLUER & ALLEN DICKERSON*
In a widely-reported development, four journalists were expelled from the United States naval
installation at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in March 2010.1 The reporters had purportedly run afoul of
Department of Defense (DOD) rules concerning access to the military commission being held on
base that week.26SHFLÀFDOO\WKH\KDGSXEOLVKHGWKHQDPHRI DIRUPHU86LQWHUURJDWRUZKRDSpeared as a defense witness for Omar Khadr, a Canadian national being tried before the commission
for the killing of an American soldier in Afghanistan.3 That interrogator, Joshua Claus, had already
EHHQLGHQWLÀHGQXPHURXVWLPHVLQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOSUHVV41RQHWKHOHVVFHUWDLQ'2'RIÀFLDOVKDG
insisted that Mr. Claus be referred to only as “Interrogator No. 1.”
The quartet allegedly violated the “Media Policy and Ground Rules” all journalists must sign before entering Cuba.5 Three of the journalists—The Miami Herald’s Carol Rosenberg, The Toronto
Star’s Michelle Shephard, and Canwest’s Steven Edwards—had their bans lifted after signing letters
* Michelle Lindo McCluer (B.A., Oklahoma, 1994; J.D., Oklahoma, 1997) served as the Executive Director of the
National Institute of Military Justice from 2008 to 2011 and is an adjunct professor at American University Washington
College of Law. She was an active duty United States Air Force judge advocate for over a decade. Allen Dickerson
(B.A., Yale, 2002; J.D., New York University, 2005) is Legal Director of the Center for Competitive Politics. He was
SUHYLRXVO\DOLWLJDWLRQDVVRFLDWHZLWKWKH1HZ<RUNRIÀFHRI .LUNODQG (OOLV//3DQGKDVVHUYHGDVDSURERQR
DWWRUQH\IRUWKH1DWLRQDO,QVWLWXWHRI 0LOLWDU\-XVWLFHDQGDVDODZFOHUNZLWKWKH2IÀFHRI WKH$LU)RUFH*HQHUDO
Counsel.
1 Jeremy W. Peters, News Media Seek Loosening of the Pentagon’s Rules at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2010), http://
TXHU\Q\WLPHVFRPJVWIXOOSDJHKWPO"UHV ('')()$&$'% VHF VSRQ SDJHZDQW
ed=2. See also Spencer Ackerman, 3HQWDJRQ%DQV)RXU-RXUQDOLVWV)URP*XDQWDQDPR%D\IRU5HSRUWLQJ,QWHUURJDWRUȨV1DPH,
WASHINGTON INDEPENDENT (May 6, 2010), http://washingtonindependent.com/84200/pentagon-bans-four-journalistsfrom-guantanamo-bay-for-reporting-interrogator-1s-name.
2 See generally DEP’T OF DEF., MEDIA POLICY AND GROUND RULES FOR NAVAL STATION GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA (GTMO)
(2010) [hereinafter DOD Media Policy], available at www.defense.gov/news/d20100910groundrules.pdf (describing what
can be photographed, who can be sketched, and how the media can travel to Guantanamo as of March 10, 2010). See
also JTF-GTMO Media Ground Rules Guantanamo Bay NAS, Cuba as of October 2007, http://media.miamiherald.com/
VPHGLDMWIJURXQGUXOHVVRXUFHSURGBDIÀOLDWHSGI  7KLVYHUVLRQRI WKHUXOHVLVPRUHDFFXUDWHIRURXU
purposes. The version from September 2010 corrects some of the issues from the March 2010 banning problem).
3 Peters, supra note 1, at 1.
4 See, e.g., Khadr Interrogator Convicted in Prisoner’s Torture Death, TORONTO STAR (March 14, 2008), http://www.thestar.
com/news/article/346304.
5 Peters, supra note 1, at 1.
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stating that they understood the reason for their expulsions.6 Paul Koring of The Globe and Mail in
Toronto refused to sign such a statement, but later regained access to the base for the completion of
Khadr’s commission in Fall 2010.7
The expulsions raise important questions of law, as the exclusion and regulation of press coverDJHRI WKHFRPPLVVLRQVLOOXVWUDWHWKHFRQÁLFWRI WZRLPSRUWDQWQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWV2QRQHKDQGOLHV
WKHQHHGWRVDIHJXDUGFODVVLÀHGLQIRUPDWLRQDQGSURWHFWWKHOLYHVRI $PHULFDQLQWHOOLJHQFHVRXUFHV
On the other hand, there is a need for an adequately-informed democratic debate concerning a major issue of American domestic and foreign policy. Both interests are vital, and a compromise must
be found. Press access to the Guantanamo military commissions therefore provides a case study for
considering the broader issue of the First Amendment’s application to coverage of military proceedLQJVZKHQWKH\FRQFHUQFODVVLÀHGRUVHQVLWLYHLQIRUPDWLRQ
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXAMPLE OF COURTS-MARTIAL
Government attempts to enjoin publication of particular information—prior restraint—are presumptively unconstitutional.8 This presumption attaches even in cases where the government asserts
national security concerns.9 Indeed, among the seminal cases of First Amendment jurisprudence,
one—New York Times Co. v. United States10³GHDOWVSHFLÀFDOO\ZLWKDQDWWHPSWE\WKHJRYHUQPHQW
WRSUHYHQWSXEOLFDWLRQRI FODVVLÀHGGRFXPHQWVGHWDLOLQJ$PHULFDQVWUDWHJ\LQWKH9LHWQDP:DU11
,QPDQ\ZD\VWKHURRWVRI )LUVW$PHQGPHQWMXULVSUXGHQFHOLHLQWKHHQGXULQJFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQ
protecting the nation and maintaining a fully informed electorate.12 The challenges posed by this
century’s military commissions are not unique.
` 11zIn the context of civilian trials, the press may “print with impunity” whatever it observes
at an open hearing.13 The very limited exceptions to this general rule—the press may be enjoined
from publishing information obtained in violation of the attorney-client privilege,14 as well as infor-

6 Id. at 2.
7 Author McCluer personally witnessed Koring at Guantanamo Bay for the completion of the Khadr trial.
8 Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976).
9 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
10 Id.
11 Id. (““Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity.’”) (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
12 John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, speech at Vanderbilt University 90th Anniversary Convocation
(May 18, 1963) available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Ready-Reference/JFK-Speeches/Remarks-in-Nashvilleat-the-90th-Anniversary-Convocation-of-Vanderbilt-University-May-18-1963.aspx (“The ignorance of one voter in a
democracy impairs the security of all.”).
13 Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Ct. of Okla. Cty., 430 U.S. 308, 311 (1977).
14 See United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1990) (upholding temporary restraining order preventing
CNN from publishing recordings of telephone calls made from prison between Noriega and his attorney); StateRecord v. State, 504 S.E.2d 592 (S.C. 1998) (upholding temporary restraining order preventing publication of videotape
containing privileged communication between an accused and his attorney).
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mation obtained through discovery where the publisher itself is a party15—tend to support its validity and scope.
While the press may generally print whatever it learns at an open hearing, judges do have the
power to legitimately close otherwise public hearings to safeguard vital public interests. But such
closings run counter to the press and public’s First Amendment rights of access to criminal trials.16
There is no question that such a right exists for trials and certain other proceedings, at least in the
federal courts.17 For novel situations, Richmond Newspapers18 establishes a two-part test to determine
whether the media enjoys a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials. First, under the “experience prong,” a court must determine whether such proceedings have historically been open to
the public.19 Second, under the “logic prong,” the court must decide whether public access to the
SURFHHGLQJVSOD\VDVLJQLÀFDQWUROHLQWKHIXQFWLRQLQJRI WKHMXGLFLDOV\VWHP20 Probable cause hearings meet this test because of their centrality to the criminal justice system; because many criminal
cases are disposed of at this stage, probable cause hearings often provide the only opportunity for
public scrutiny.217KH6XSUHPH&RXUWKDVLGHQWLÀHGDVLPLODUSXEOLFLQWHUHVWLQVXSSUHVVLRQKHDULQJV
as they often deal with issues of government misconduct.22
On the other hand, proceedings may be closed under the Richmond Newspapers’ experience/
logic test in certain circumstances, including those involving the protection of national security.
The Third Circuit has ruled that the test allows for closed deportation proceedings to vindicate
certain national security interests.23 That case, North Jersey Media Group, is particularly relevant since
it occurred in the context of removal proceedings—administrative procedures conducted before
an Article III court.24 Nonetheless, the court chose to apply the experience/logic test of Richmond
Newspapers, despite suggestions from the government that it not do so.25
North Jersey Media Group arose out of the many deportations that occurred following the attacks
of September 11, 2001, when the Department of Justice closed the deportation proceedings of
15 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (holding that a protective order prohibiting dissemination of
information gathered through discovery did not violate petitioner’s First amendment rights).
16 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 558–81 (1980). While such a First Amendment right
exists in the context of both civilian and military courts, it is entwined with an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to a
public trial. The rights, however, are distinct. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596,
601 (1982); ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363, 365 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
17 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (Press-Enterprise I) (upholding public access to jury
selection proceedings); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II) (upholding public
access to pre-trial probable cause hearings).
18 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
19 Id. at 564–69.
20 Id. at 569–573; see also El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 149 (1993); Press-Enterprise II at 8;
Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604–07; United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 1982).
21 Press-Enterprise II at 12.
22 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45–46 (1984).
23 N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2002).
24 Id. at 200.
25 Id. at 207–08.

4

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

Vol. 2, No. 1

“special interest” individuals.26 The Third Circuit found that these deportation proceedings failed
both prongs of the Richmond Newspapers test. After reviewing the history of public access to administrative procedures, the court found that such hearings lacked the unbroken history of openness
inherent in Article III criminal trials.27 Moreover, under the “logic” prong, the court considered
WKHJRYHUQPHQW·VDUJXPHQWVVXSSRUWLQJWKHFORVHGKHDULQJVVSHFLÀFDOO\KLJKOLJKWLQJWKHGDQJHURXV
possibility that terrorist groups could discover intelligence sourcing and methods, weaknesses in
U.S. border protection, and information regarding the identity of compromised terrorist cells.28 The
government claimed that immigration judges did not have the expertise to balance these concerns
on an individual basis, and that a blanket closing of the relevant proceedings was, consequently,
logical.29 The court agreed, stating that the the dangers enumerated by the government outweighed
the advantages of openness.30 The Third Circuit declined to apply the First Amendment to removal
proceedings, which remained closed. The Sixth Circuit, meanwhile, conducted similar analysis and
ruled differently, emphasizing that “[o]pen proceedings, with a vigorous and scrutinizing press, serve
to ensure the durability of our democracy.”31
A. Application of the First Amendment
Once public First Amendment rights attach to a proceeding, the test for constitutionally closing
such a trial or hearing parallels the application of strict scrutiny in this and other contexts.32 A judge
PD\QRWFORVHDFULPLQDOWULDODEVHQWDFRPSHOOLQJLQWHUHVWDUWLFXODWHGRQWKHUHFRUGÀQGLQJWKDW
DOWHUQDWLYHDFWLRQVVKRUWRI FORVLQJWKHFRXUWURRPZRXOGSURYHLQVXIÀFLHQWWRSURWHFWWKDWLQWHUHVW33
The rule applies to the closure of part or all of a proceeding, a decision that must also be narrowly
tailored to the affected interest. 34 For instance, the court could close only the parts of the trial that
DFWXDOO\GHDOZLWKWKHVHQVLWLYHRUFODVVLÀHGHYLGHQFH35
The law is similar in the context of courts-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
8&0- VSHFLÀFDOO\ZKHQDQLQGLYLGXDOVHHNVWRVKLHOGSDUWRI DFRXUWPDUWLDOIURPWKHSXEOLF36 In
this area, military appellate courts have held that the First Amendment grants the public a right to
attend and observe courts-martial, and the same principles of compelling interest and narrowly26 Id. at 202–03.
27 Id. at 213.
28 Id. at 218–19.
29 Id. at 219.
30 Id. at 220.
31 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 711 (6th Cir. 2002).
32 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to freedom of speech); Buckley v. Valeo,
86   DSSO\LQJVWULFWVFUXWLQ\WRFDPSDLJQÀQDQFH /HPRQY.XUW]PDQ86   DSSO\LQJVWULFW
scrutiny test to the Establishment Clause).
33 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980).
34 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607–10 (1982).
35 See 5LFKPRQG1HZVSDSHUV86DWQ ´>1@DWLRQDOVHFXULW\FRQFHUQVDERXWFRQÀGHQWLDOLW\PD\
sometimes warrant closures during sensitive portions of trial proceedings, such as testimony about state secrets.”).
36 10 U.S.C. § 801 et. seq. (2010).

Vol. 2, No. 1

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

5

tailored policy apply.37 Examples of such a compelling interest naturally include the protection of
FODVVLÀHGLQIRUPDWLRQ38ZKLFKLVWKHRQO\´FORVHDEOHµLQWHUHVWVSHFLÀFDOO\FRQWHPSODWHGE\WKH5XOHV
for Courts-Martial.39
Of particular importance in the context of this article, the appellate courts have recognized that
the press itself has standing within the court-martial system to legally enforce its First Amendment
prerogatives.40 The simultaneous presence of an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial
further complicates the situation, providing an additional constitutional argument against the closure
of proceedings. For instance, in ABC, Inc. v. Powell, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
found that an accused has a Sixth Amendment right to a public Article 32 investigation.41 Moreover,
the court held that when the defendant has the right to a public proceeding, the press has a First
Amendment right to attend.42 This distinction is important, as the amendments vindicate different
interests.
As the above cases demonstrate, the case law generally deals with issues of judicial practice, that
is, where a presiding judge orders the closing of a hearing or trial. In the context of the military
FRPPLVVLRQVWZRDGGLWLRQDOZULQNOHVSUHVHQWWKHPVHOYHV7KHÀUVWLVWKDWRI DFFHVVWR*XDQWDnamo Bay itself—an open hearing is useless if the government restricts the press’ ability to observe
SURFHHGLQJV7KHVHFRQGLVVXHFRQFHUQVWKHUROHRI SXEOLFDIIDLUVRIÀFHUVDQGRWKHUQRQMXULVWVLQ
determining issues of access.
B. The Problem of Access
As has been suggested in the context of courts-martial, simply moving a trial to a remote locaWLRQPD\VRPHWLPHVSURWHFWFODVVLÀHGLQIRUPDWLRQE\OLPLWLQJWKHHDVHZLWKZKLFKWKHSUHVVDQG
public may attend.43 The mere fact that the military commissions are held on a naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba—an isolated slice of land surrounded by ocean to the south and a hostile regime
OHJDOO\LQDFFHVVLEOHWR$PHULFDQVMXVWRYHUWKHKLOOVWRWKHQRUWK³LPSRVHVVLJQLÀFDQWOLPLWVRQWKH
ability of members of the press to be physically present for the hearings held there.
At least one federal court has considered the right of the press to access Guantanamo Bay itself.
37 See, e.g., ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363, 365 (C.A.A.F. 1997); United States v. Travers, 25 M.J. 61, 62 (C.M.A.
1987); United States v. Scott, 48 M.J. 663, 666 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 1998); M.R.E. 505.
38 United States v. Grunden, 2 M.J. 116, 123 (C.M.A. 1977).
39 See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 806(b) (2008).
40 An Article 32 investigation is comparable to a civilian court preliminary hearing. ABC, Inc., 47 M.J. at 365 (“[W]
hen an accused is entitled to a public hearing, the press enjoys the same right and has standing to complain if access is
denied”) (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of the County of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596 (1982)).
41 Id. (“[A]bsent ‘cause shown that outweighs the value of openness,’ the military accused is likewise entitled to a
public Article 32 investigative hearing.”) (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside County,
464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984)).
42 Id.
43 See Maj. Joshua E. Kastenberg, Analyzing the Constitutional Tensions and Applicability of Military Rule of Evidence 505
in Courts-Martial over United States Service Members: Secrecy in the Shadow of Longtree, 55 A.F. L. REV. 233, 266 (2004) (“In
essence, there is no lawful prohibition against moving a court-martial to Diego Garcia, Guantanamo, or Adak.”).
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In Getty Images, media organizations sought an injunction that would have required the DOD to
WUHDWVXFKJURXSVHTXDOO\ZKHQDVVLJQLQJWKHOLPLWHGVORWVDOORWWHGIRUWKHÁLJKWVWR*XDQWDQDPRDQG
seats in the courtroom to cover the military commissions.44 The district court did not consider the
public’s right to access criminal proceedings under the First Amendment.45 Instead, it noted that
“access [to Guantanamo Bay] is necessarily limited by the logistical support and resources that the
PLOLWDU\FDQSURYLGHµDQGYRLFHGD´UHOXFWDQ>FH@WRLQWHUIHUHVLJQLÀFDQWO\LQWKHPLOLWDU\·VFRQGXFW
of its affairs.”46 Consequently, the court chose not to “elaborate on the precise parameters of equal
access standards and procedures that may be required by the Constitution.”47 The court declined to
issue an injunction, but did note that “the First and Fifth Amendments seem to require, at a minimum, that before determining which media organizations receive the limited access available, the
DOD must not only have some criteria to guide its determinations, but must have a reasonable way
of assessing whether the criteria are met.”48
Getty Images suggests that DOD rules limiting access to military bases that host military commissions impact some constitutional rights, in that they implicitly restrict press access to those proceedings. While the judicial branch has historically shown deference to military matters,49 courts would
OLNHO\ÀQGXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDODUXOHDEVROXWHO\SURKLELWLQJSUHVVDFFHVVWR*XDQWDQDPR%\LPSOLFDtion, and as noted by the D.C. District Court, the DOD is required to put in place rules that allow
some level of reasonable access by fairly-selected journalists.50
II. THE UNITED STATES MILITARY COMMISSIONS
Much has been written about the origins, strengths, and weaknesses of the tribunals currently
sitting at Guantanamo Bay, both in terms of their transparency and their ability to deal with national
security issues.51 This article will revisit the founding documents of those courts only to the extent
necessary to draw parallels between their foundations, rules, and procedures, those of civilian courts
44 Getty Images News Servs. Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., 193 F. Supp. 2d 112, 113–14 (D.D.C. 2002).
45 See id. at 122 (“No persuasive judicial precedent . . . has been cited, and in light of the unique military context
present here, the Court does not believe that the Constitution requires the establishment of a press pool at Guantanamo
Bay.”).
46 Id. at 120–21.
47 Id. at 122.
48 Id. at 121.
49 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (noting that courts “give great deference to the
professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest);
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 832 (2008) (stating, as regards foreign and military affairs, “perhaps in no other area
has the Court accorded Congress greater deference” (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981)).
50 See 193 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (“[T]he First and Fifth Amendments seem to require, at a minimum, that . . . [the] DOD
must not only have some criteria to guide its determinations, but must have a reasonable way of assessing whether the
criteria are met.”).
51 See e.g. William Glaberson, U.S. May Revive Guantanamo Military Courts, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2009), http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/05/02/us/politics/02gitmo.html?_r=2; LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MILITARY TRIBUNALS:
HISTORICAL PATTERNS AND LESSONS (2004); ABA Task Force on Terrorism and the Law, Report and Recommendations
on Military Commissions (2002).
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(notably the federal district courts), and the system of courts-martial regulated by the UCMJ.
A. General Background
The Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA) currently governs the trials of detainees at
Guantanamo Bay.52 The Act explicitly authorizes military judges to close commission proceedings
WRWKHSXEOLFEXW´RQO\XSRQPDNLQJDVSHFLÀFÀQGLQJWKDWVXFKFORVXUHLVQHFHVVDU\WRSURWHFW
information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national
security . . . [or to] ensure the physical safety of individuals.”53 In the strict scrutiny language explained above, § 949d(c)(2) of the MCA sets out the “state interests” deemed compelling enough by
Congress to require derogation from the default open proceeding requirement.
The Act, however, suggests that the UCMJ serves as the model for interpreting commission
rules by explicitly noting that “the judicial construction and application of [the UCMJ]” are instructive in analyzing the Act, although it cautions that such judicial analysis is “not of its own force
binding on military commissions.”54 Further, recognizing the special nature of the commissions,
the Act provides that the Secretary of Defense has some authority to “make such exceptions in the
applicability of the procedures and rules of evidence otherwise applicable in general courts-martial
as may be required by the unique circumstances of the conduct of military and intelligence operations during hostilities or by other practical need consistent with [the Military Commissions Act].”55
The Secretary’s designee, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, issued the Regulation
for Trial by Military Commission on April 27, 2007, pursuant to that authority.56 As to trial closure,
KRZHYHUWKH5HJXODWLRQFRQWULEXWHVQRIXUWKHUJXLGDQFHH[FHSWIRUDUHTXLUHPHQWWKDWWKHÀQGLQJV
required to support the trial judge’s decision be “appended to the record of trial.”57 This provides
OLWWOHGLUHFWLRQDVLGHIURPDUHLWHUDWLRQWKDWDFWXDOÀQGLQJVRI IDFWPXVWEHPDGHE\DMXGJHVHHNLQJ
to close proceedings.
7KHÀQDODXWKRULWDWLYHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI WKH$FWLVWKH0DQXDOIRU0LOLWDU\&RPPLVVLRQV 00& 
issued by the DOD in April 2010.58 Rule for Military Commission 806, contained in the MMC, is
helpfully entitled “Public trial.”59 In discussing the laws governing closure, the Manual notes that
“the military judge may take other lesser measures . . . to protect information and ensure the physical

52 10 U.S.C. 47a (2010). See also0LOLWDU\&RPPLVVLRQV$FWRI 3XE/6WDW   FRGLÀHGDV
amended at 10 U.S.C. 47a (2010)).
53 10 U.S.C. 47a (2010) at § 949d(c)(2).
54 § 948b(c).
55 § 949(a)(b)(1).
56 OFFICE OF THE MILITARY COMM’NS, DEP’T OF DEF., REGULATION FOR TRIAL BY MILITARY COMM’NS (2007), http://
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/reg_for_trial_by_commission.pdf. [hereinafter RTMC].
57 Id. at 110 (§ 18-3: Procedures Concerning Spectators).
58 DEP’T OF DEF., MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS (2010), http://www.defense.gov/news/2010_Manual_for_
Military_Commissions.pdf [hereinafter MMC].
59 Id. at II-73 (“Except as otherwise provided in chapter 47A of title 10, United States Code, and this Manual, military
commissions shall be publicly held. For purposes of this rule, ‘public’ includes representatives of the press . . . .”).
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safety of individuals.”607KH00&VSHFLÀFDOO\VXJJHVWVWKHXVHRI GHOD\HGEURDGFDVWWHFKQRORJLHV61
Moreover, it makes clear that the standard of review a military judge uses when considering classiÀHGPDWHULDOSXUVXDQWWRDGHFLVLRQWRFORVHWKHSURFHHGLQJLVQRWde novo.62 Rather, the judge is to
defer to the classifying authority after verifying that governing regulations were followed.63
The Discussion section of Rule 806 also notes that “there may be other sources of authority to
close the hearing, such as Mil. Comm. R. Evid. 412, or the authority of a military judge to close a
hearing in ‘unusual circumstances’ warranting an ex parte session.”64 But, neither of those sources
of authority would appear to provide useful guidance to a military judge seeking to protect sensitive,
DOEHLWXQFODVVLÀHGLQIRUPDWLRQIURPJHQHUDOGLVVHPLQDWLRQ0LOLWDU\&RPPLVVLRQ5XOHRI (YLGHQFH
412 governs admission of evidence concerning nonconsensual sexual offenses.65 It requires a closed
hearing when the military judge considers certain evidence generally covered by that Rule’s prohibition on evidence concerning an alleged victim’s sexual behavior or predisposition. United States v.
Kaspers addressed the right of an accused to an ex parte hearing, at which the accused intended to argue the need for an expert witness at government expense.66 The court held that such hearings were
generally offered only in “unusual circumstances,” which were not present in that case.67
Military commissions are subject to the jurisdiction of their own appellate panel, decisions of
which may be appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and, ultimately,
to the Supreme Court.68 But, at present, there is little binding precedent constraining the manner in
which military judges preside over these trials. Most obviously, the United States Court of Military
Commission Review has yet to issue a ruling regarding press access and the limits of judicial discretion. Also, as detailed above, the regulations promulgated by the DOD provide relatively minimal
guidance. Given the dearth of other rules governing the commission judges’ proper role in granting
or limiting media access to the trials, the Military Commissions Act’s suggestion that the case law of
courts-martial should guide interpretation of the Act is particularly apt.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS: PROVIDING ACCESS WHILE SAFEGUARDING SENSITIVE INFORMATION
A. Appellate Review and the Writ of Mandamus
As mentioned above, the military justice system has allowed media organizations to directly sue
for access to courts-martial. In at least one seminal case, ABC Inc., the Court of Appeals for the
60 Id. at II-74 (discussion to R. 806(b)(2)(C)); see also 10 U.S.C. § 949d(c).
61 MMC¸ supra note 58, at II-74.
62 Id.
63 Id. ´7KHUHYLHZLVWRYHULI\WKHH[LVWHQFHRI DOHJDOEDVLVIRUWKHDJHQF\RIÀFLDO·VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWKDWLQIRUPDWLRQLV
FODVVLÀHGDQGWKDWQRVXPPDU\RI VXFKLQIRUPDWLRQFDQEHSURYLGHGFRQVLVWHQWZLWKQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\µ 
64 Id. (citing United States v. Kaspers, 47 M.J. 176 (C.A.A.F. 1997)).
65 Id. at III-16 (“Mil. Comm. R. Evid. 412: Nonconsensual sexual offenses; relevance of victim’s behavior or sexual
predisposition”).
66 See Kaspers, 47 M.J. at 177.
67 Id. at 180 (citing United States v. Garries, 22 M.J. 288, 291 (C.M.A. 1986)).
68 See 10 U.S.C. § 950(a)–(g) (2006).
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Armed Forces (CAAF) ordered a pre-trial hearing opened to the press after several media companies
ÀOHGIRUDZULWRI PDQGDPXVGLUHFWO\WR&$$)69 The court did not rely on any provision of the
8&0-LQÀQGLQJMXULVGLFWLRQRYHUWKHPDWWHUDQGUHMHFWHGDQDUJXPHQWWKDWWKHPHGLDRUJDQL]DWLRQV
VKRXOGKDYHÀUVWUDLVHGWKHLVVXHEHIRUHWKH$UP\&RXUWRI &ULPLQDO$SSHDOV70 Rather, the court
relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), which provides that “[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by
Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”71
Notably, this provision does not specify which courts “established by Act of Congress” may issue a writ of mandamus. If the CAAF or a service Court of Criminal Appeals, all of which are Article I courts established by the UCMJ (as opposed to Article III courts established by the Judiciary
Act), may invoke § 1651, it appears that the Court for Military Commission Review (CMCR) may do
so as well. Consequently, one approach to creating a body of relevant case law would be for press
RUJDQL]DWLRQVWRÀOHSHWLWLRQVIRUZULWVRI PDQGDPXVLQDSSURSULDWHFDVHVHLWKHUWRWKH&0&5RU
the D.C. Circuit, challenging a military judge’s closure orders. While this approach has the advantage
of having been successful in the UCMJ context, and presents the possibility of potentially creating
DERG\RI JXLGLQJODZIRUPLOLWDU\FRPPLVVLRQMXGJHVWKHUHPD\EHSUDFWLFDOEDUULHUVWRÀOLQJDQG
appearing before a part-time tribunal like the CMCR.
B. The Military Judge: Discretion and Enforcement
As previously noted, the military judge has authority to close hearings either to safeguard protected information or to prevent physical harm to an individual. Yet, military judges have surprisLQJO\OLWWOHJXLGDQFHLQLPSOHPHQWLQJWKLVUHVSRQVLELOLW\&RQVHTXHQWO\DWSUHVHQWWKHÀUVWUXOLQJVRQ
closing proceedings to the press will be made, almost in a vacuum, by military trial judges.
The military judges sitting at Guantanamo Bay are, by law, active-duty military judges in the various military services.72 That is, they have served as trial judges in courts-martial, and do so simultaneously with their commission duties. They are informed by their experience as military lawyers and
their deep knowledge of, and familiarity with, the court-martial system. For instance, one of the authors was present for a military commission hearing in the Noor Uthman Muhammed case. At that
hearing, the commission judge, Navy Captain Moira Modzelewski, explicitly noted her own practice
as a court-martial judge in helping the defense counsel gain access to prosecution FBI witnesses.
Whereas pre-hearing interviews of prosecution witnesses by the defense is strictly voluntary in the
civilian federal courts, such meetings are a routine (albeit not required) practice of courts-martial.
Of course, there are a number of differences between the court-martial and the military com69 47 M.J. 363, 366 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
70 Id. at 364.
71 See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2006).
 86&M E    ´$PLOLWDU\MXGJHVKDOOEHDFRPPLVVLRQHGRIÀFHURI WKHDUPHGIRUFHVZKRLVDPHPEHU
RI WKHEDURI D)HGHUDOFRXUWRUDPHPEHURI WKHEDURI WKHKLJKHVWFRXUWRI D6WDWHDQGZKRLVFHUWLÀHGWREHTXDOLÀHG
for duty under section 826 of this title (article 26 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice) as a military judge of general
courts-martial by the Judge Advocate General of the armed force of which such military judge is a member.”).
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mission systems. Most obviously, the case law concerning public access to courts-martial is likely
inapplicable to military commissions, at least in practice. While one may generally be admitted to a
military base to observe a court-martial, access to Guantanamo Bay is by invitation only.73 Similarly,
WKHDQWLFLSDWHGLQFUHDVHGQHHGIRUFODVVLÀHGLQIRUPDWLRQLQWKHFRPPLVVLRQWULDOVDVRSSRVHGWRWKH
UDUHLQWURGXFWLRQRI FODVVLÀHGHYLGHQFHLQDFRXUWPDUWLDOKHLJKWHQVWKHULVNRI LQDGYHUWHQWGLVFORVXUH7KLVFUHDWHVDPDMRUGLIÀFXOW\IRUPLOLWDU\MXGJHV7KH\DUHUHTXLUHGE\UHJXODWLRQVDQGDUJXably by the Constitution, to provide the greatest possible access to commission proceedings. But, by
making the proceedings more transparent, they increase the risk that a party, counsel, or witness will
UHIHUHQFHFODVVLÀHGRURSHUDWLRQDOO\VHQVLWLYHLQIRUPDWLRQLQRSHQFRXUW
&RXUWRUGHUVSURKLELWLQJWKHUHSXEOLFDWLRQRI VXFKFODVVLÀHGLQIRUPDWLRQSUHVHQWRQHSRVVLEOH
solution to this dilemma—a reasonable remedy since the people present in the military commission courtrooms are both limited in number and screened for access. But, such an order must be
enforceable to be effective, and it is unclear whether a military judge’s contempt powers under the
0&$DUHXSWRWKDWWDVN6SHFLÀFDOO\LWLVXQFOHDULI DPLOLWDU\FRPPLVVLRQMXGJHKDVMXULVGLFWLRQ
to hold a reporter in contempt for violating any protective order. In this context, the commissions’
jurisdiction is limited: “A military commission may punish for contempt any person who uses any
menacing word, sign or gesture in its presence, or who disturbs its proceedings by any riot or disorGHU7KHSXQLVKPHQWPDQ\QRWH[FHHGFRQÀQHPHQWIRUGD\VRUDÀQHRI RUERWKµ74 The
2010 Manual for Military Commissions explicitly includes civilians in this provision, with the Convening Authority being informed and tasked with “taking necessary action.”75 But the jurisdiction
of the Convening Authority over a civilian, especially one whose only contact with the proceedings
is as an observer, is nebulous, as the commissions’ jurisdiction is limited to alien unprivileged enemy
belligerents.76 Nothing in the 2009 MCA suggests expanded jurisdiction for the Convening Authority himself.
Judges in courts-martial have stronger contempt powers. Beyond the powers noted above, they
may also sanction any witness who refuses to appear in court.77 The contempt order may be certiÀHGWRDFLYLOLDQ86$WWRUQH\·VRIÀFHDQGHQIRUFHGE\IHGHUDOPDUVKDOVLQIHGHUDOGLVWULFWFRXUW78
7KHGLVWULFWFRXUWMXGJH³ZKRJHQHUDOO\HQMR\VXQTXHVWLRQHGMXULVGLFWLRQ³FRXOGWKHQÀQHRU
imprison the subject of a contempt order. But, current law explicitly denies military commission
judges this authority.79 The National Defense Authorization Act for 2011 includes an amendment to
WKHFRQWHPSWSRZHUVRI DPLOLWDU\MXGJHWKDWVLJQLÀFDQWO\LQFUHDVHVDPLOLWDU\MXGJH·VDXWKRULW\LQWKLV

73 See, e.g., DOD Media Policy, supra note 2.
74 MMC, supra note 58, at II-14 (Rule 201(c)).
75 See idDW,, 5XOH H DQG'LVFXVVLRQ GLIIHUHQWLDWLQJEHWZHHQSURSHUSXQLVKPHQWDQGQRWLÀFDWLRQIRUD
civilian versus military person after they are charged with contempt).
76 10 U.S.C. § 948(c) (2006).
77 10 U.S.C. § 847(a), 848 (2011) .
78 § 847(b)–(c).
79 MMC, supra note 58, at II-77 (Commentary to Rule 809).
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area.80 Under the newly expanded language, a military judge’s contempt power currently extends to
any person who “willfully disobeys the [court’s] lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command
. . . .”816XFKSRZHULVHVSHFLDOO\QHHGHGLQWKHPLOLWDU\FRPPLVVLRQFRQWH[WWRLQVWLOOFRQÀGHQFH
in military judges that any required protective orders will be obeyed or enforced. But, again, the
legislation explicitly exempts the current incarnation of military commissions.82 In short, the scope
and enforceability of a court-martial judge’s contempt powers are far more robust than in a military
commission context.
Thus, military judges have distinctly different scopes of contempt authority, depending on
whether they are presiding over courts-martial or over military commissions. In the latter case, a
prudent judge cannot be certain he or she can adequately enforce an order protecting inadvertently
UHOHDVHGFODVVLÀHGLQIRUPDWLRQ&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHUHLVDQREYLRXVWHPSWDWLRQWRHUURQWKHVLGHRI 
FDXWLRQFORVLQJSURFHHGLQJVZKHQWKHUHLVHYHQDUHPRWHFKDQFHWKDWFODVVLÀHGLQIRUPDWLRQZLOOEH
discussed, and generally limiting the portions of commission proceedings open to the press. This
is not a certainty, but the calculus is plain, as is the risk of overly-secretive proceedings. Congress
could easily eliminate this risk by trusting military judges with the same powers they enjoy when they
preside over courts-martial.
&7KH5ROHRI WKH3HQWDJRQ3XEOLF$IIDLUV2IÀFH
While lawyers traditionally look to the courts for guidance, the institution with the most direct
LQÁXHQFHRQWKLVSDUWLFXODULVVXHLVQRWMXGLFLDO,QWKHFDVHRI SUHVVDFFHVVWRWKHFRPPLVVLRQVDW
*XDQWDQDPR%D\WKDWLQVWLWXWLRQLVWKH'2'2IÀFHRI 3XEOLF$IIDLUVRIWHQZRUNLQJWKURXJKLWV
VXERUGLQDWHDUPWKH2IÀFHRI 0LOLWDU\&RPPLVVLRQV3XEOLF$IIDLUV 20&3$ 
As already noted, the four reporters expelled from Guantanamo Bay in May 2010 were not
barred for violating a court order or anything else directly related to the judicial conduct of the
military commissions.83 Indeed, the military judge presiding over that commission hearing did not
implement the ban. Rather, the reporters ran afoul of the “Media Policy and Ground Rules” they
had signed as a prerequisite to securing permission to travel to Cuba.84 That document is drafted
and promulgated by public affairs professionals attached to the military commissions, not by the
commission judges themselves.
,QGHHGSXEOLFDIIDLUVRIÀFHUV·LQÁXHQFHRYHUMRXUQDOLVWV·DFFHVVWR*XDQWDQDPR%D\DVZHOODV
the scope of their reporting, is best illustrated by the results of the May 2010 expulsions. The journalists had been expelled for naming a witness whose identity was already in the public record, infor-

80 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, P.L. 111-383 542(b), 124 STAT. 4218 (2011), available at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00000848----000-.html.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Peters, supra note 1, at 1.
84 Id..
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mation that the journalists gained from sources outside the military commissions.85 Under new rules
promulgated in September 2010, publishing that exact kind of information is no longer a violation
of the Ground Rules.86 This change in policy, along with others contained in the revised document,
was not the direct result of litigation; in fact, no judge ruled on the expulsions. Rather, the PentaJRQUHYLVHGWKHJURXQGUXOHVDWWKHVROHGLVFUHWLRQRI WKHSXEOLFDIIDLUVRIÀFLDOVLQWKH2IÀFHRI WKH
6HFUHWDU\RI 'HIHQVHDIWHUPHGLDUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDQGWKHLUDWWRUQH\VPHWZLWK'2'RIÀFLDOV
That development suggests that questions of press access should be centralized and rigorously
considered by senior-level DOD personnel. To that end, one of the most helpful aspects of the
new rules is that they now contain appeals provisions, something not available under the previous
system. Disagreements concerning whether photographs and video compromise Guantanamo Bay
security may be appealed to the Commander of the Group Task Force with responsibility for the
commission sites, who must then decide the issue within 24 hours.87 Moreover, reporters are explicitly permitted to challenge the designation of particular information as protected. They may do so
E\DSSHDOLQJWRWKHPLOLWDU\MXGJHWRZKRPWKHSXEOLFDIIDLUVRIÀFLDOVZLOOGHIHU0HPEHUVRI WKH
press also can opt to appeal to the Joint Task Force Commander, depending on which of those two
authorities made the initial designation.880RUHRYHULI SXEOLFDIIDLUVRIÀFLDOVEHOLHYHDYLRODWLRQRI 
the ground rules has occurred, media members may appeal to the Principal Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Public Affairs.89
,QVKRUWWKHSXEOLFDIIDLUVRIÀFLDOVDQGRWKHUPLOLWDU\PHPEHUVZKRDUHDVVLJQHGRQDQHYHU
changing basis to escort the media exert enormous practical control over press access to Guantanamo Bay and commission proceedings.907KHWUDQVLWLRQWRDPRUHÁH[LEOHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKH
3HQWDJRQSXEOLFDIIDLUVRIÀFHDQGWKHSUHVVLVZHOFRPHDQGWKHDSSHDOVSURFHGXUHVLQSODFHXQGHU
WKHUHYLVHG*URXQG5XOHVVKRXOGKHOSHVWDEOLVKDERG\RI JXLGHOLQHVWRDVVLVWORZHUOHYHORIÀFLDOV
and, ultimately, facilitate the maximum public access consistent with protecting national security.
But the Ground Rules cannot replace the powers of a military judge to control his or her courtroom
and the protective orders issued therein, a point that is explicitly conceded by the Ground Rules
themselves.91

85 Kevin Baron, Pentagon Drops Controversial Ban on GTMO Reporters, STARS AND STRIPES (July 13, 2010), http://www.
stripes.com/blogs/stripes-central/stripes-central-1.8040/pentagon-drops-controversial-ban-on-gtmo-reporters-1.110927
86 See DOD Media Policy, supra note 2, at 4 (“[A reporter] will not be considered in violation of these ground rules
for re-publishing what otherwise would be considered Protected Information, where that information was legitimately
obtained in the course of newsgathering independent of any receipt of information while at GTMO [Guantanamo Bay],
or while transiting to or from GTMO on transportation provided by DOD (or other U.S. government entities.”).
87 Id. at 6 (Rule E(6)).
88 Id. at 10–11 (Rule J(1)–(2)).
89 Id. at 11 (Rule J(3)).
90 Carol Rosenberg, Commentary: For Reporters, the Rules at Guantanamo Change Daily, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (July 26,
2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/07/26/98146/commentary-for-reporters-the-rules.html.
91 See DOD Media Policy, supra note 2 at 11 (Rule J(4)) (“Nothing in this section is intended to interfere with a
military judge’s authority within his or her courtroom.”).

Vol. 2, No. 1

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

13

D. The Role of Congress
 $WWKHHQGRI WKHGD\ZULWVRI PDQGDPXVDQGDSSHDOVWRSXEOLFDIIDLUVRIÀFLDOVDUHVWRSJDS
measures that do not solve the larger First Amendment issues. One concrete suggestion for solving
the dilemma would have Congress enshrine greater press access in the statutory law governing the
commissions themselves, without negatively affecting national security interests. Such a revision has
already been suggested above: Provide substantial, enforceable contempt powers for military judges
assigned to the commissions. But other solutions should also be considered.
Obvious alternatives include the following: requiring a greater number of courtroom slots for
reporters; establishing explicit statutory standing for individual reporters to challenge the closing
of proceedings before the military judge as the individual most familiar with his or her own closure
decision; and, providing explicit statutory authority for the CMCR to review closure orders on an
interlocutory basis. A model for such appeals could be the practice of the United States Supreme
Court in capital cases, where an individual member of the Court may hear appeals (such as requests
for stays of execution) and can issue rulings on the subject.92
Working out the parameters of the media’s right to cover these historic commissions is a pressing concern, particularly given the small fraction of the American public—and even the small
proportion of victims and family members—who will ever get the opportunity to attend the commissions in person. The urgency is all the more acute now, given that the military commissions are
PRYLQJIXOOVSHHGDKHDGLQWU\LQJWKHPRVWKLJKSURÀOHDQGFRPSOH[WHUURUFDVHVVLQFHWKHDWWDFNVD
decade ago.93
IV. CONCLUSION
,QUHFHQWPRQWKVWKH2IÀFHRI 0LOLWDU\&RPPLVVLRQVKDVH[KLELWHGDUHQHZHGFRPPLWPHQW
to transparency in the commission proceedings by revamping its website94 and providing remote
viewing locations for victims, family members, and the press—but not the general public—to watch
commission hearings.95 Certainly, such increased access is a welcome development, but it likely
PHDQVWKDWWKHWHQVLRQEHWZHHQWKHULJKWVLQFRQÁLFWGHVFULEHGLQWKLVDUWLFOHZLOOQRWÀQGMXGLFLDORU
legislative resolution any time soon.

92 United States Supreme Court Rules 22 and 23.
93 See 9/11 Suspects Charged Again at Gitmo, NBC News (May 31, 2011), available at http://www.nbcnewyork.com/
news/politicshalid-Sheikh-Mohammed-911-Suspects-Guantanamo-122878234.html; Dwyer Arce, WikiLeaks Releases
&ODVVLÀHG*XDQWDQDPR'RFXPHQWV, JURIST (April 25, 2011), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/04/wikileaks-releasesFODVVLÀHGJXDQWDQDPRGRFXPHQWVSKS&DURO5RVHQEHUJPentagon Seeks Death for Accused USS Cole Bomber, MIAMI HERALD
(April 20, 2011), http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/04/20/2177510/pentagon-seeks-death-for-accused.html
94 Charles “Cully” Stimson, Military Commissions Just Became More Transparent, available at http://blog.heritage.
org/2011/09/28/military-commissions-just-became-more-transparent/ (last visited November 6, 2011).
95 Carol Rosenberg, Prosecutors propose wider public viewing of Guantánamo terror trial, MIAMI HERALD
(November 5, 2011), http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/11/05/v-print/2488542/prosecutors-propose-wider-public.
html#ixzz1cyEPnpQs

